Suggested political amendments to our justice system falls short
Some of the highlights of the proposed changes to the 1999 constitution are coming to light in parts. Citizens are also responding to these essentially crucial steps to renew our democracy and our esteem of the rule of law.
Whatever the document that emerges at the end may not be perfect. We expect however to move notches higher from the query of today. Two important highlights include the separation of the attorney general of the federation from the minister of justice. The second is the cutting away of the chief justice of the federation from being chairman of two institutions: The Federal Judicial Service Commission and the National Judicial Institute.
The two steps are salutary if only as paces away from the rut of today. On the issue of the attorney general of the federation, this newspaper and sentient minds have argued against the wedding of both positions because of the fallacious presumption that an attorney general of the federation will automatically follow the path of justice. We are glad this nuance is appreciated. But we still hold that the position of attorney general should be pried from the control of the political elite, especially that of the president. He should not be appointed by the legislature either. We suggest that the onus of appointing that position should belong to a reconstituted National Judicial Commission that will comprise men of wise and detached disposition.
The removal of the chief justice as head of the FJSC and NJI are commendable, but only a start. The FJSC nominates federal judicial appointments while the NJI trains judicial officers. These are important but not as crucial as those who constitute the NJC. Reports have it that the new amendments suggest that the Nigerian Bar Association will now have its members increased from five to 10, and rather than play the aloof force in the disciplinary process of its members, it can now participate, which is fair. It has a voice, but not an overwhelming presence that would allow it perform a partial role to its members.
Today, the NJC membership is flawed because it violates a fundamental creed of law: that no one can be a judge in their own cause. The NJC now parades members who are in active service, and that means that such personages will have to preside and make judgments in matters that pertain to the activities and careers of persons sitting in the commission. A majority of its members are on the bench, and they are supposed to regulate and sanction activities on the bench. It is a paradoxical nightmare.
Some of the positions include the chief justice, the next most senior justice of the Supreme Court, the president of the Court of Appeal, the chief judge of the Federal High Court, the President of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria, One Grand Qadi, one president of the customary court of appeal. These positions constitute the majority on the commission, and it tends to stifle the ability of the group to restrain and punish fellow members.
We have, in the past decade, witnessed contentious issues that concern members of the commission. The NJC was in an awkward position to take stands. We can recall the situation of a former chief Justice Walter Onnoghen and Justice Ayo Salami who was president of the court of appeal.
There are dangers we have seen. One, the fact that many of them are serving officers of the law subjects them to the power of one man or woman: the chief justice of the federation. This also means that they are judicial officers of the state and therefore can shrink with awe for the political elite who can manipulate them. Political influences are malignant in a democracy. Justice can therefore quiver in the face of terrors from the executive branch.
When the Directorate of State Security raided the homes of judicial officers a few years ago, which is anathema to the law, the NJC did little to challenge that autocratic hour. Most of these persons in the NJC are career men and women and conscious of their bread-and-butter challenges.
The inclusion of NBA members, who are not subject to a bullying executive, could help its independence. Even as the law stands today the retired judges are selected by the chief justice. This makes them beholden to their appointee.
Clearly the power of the CJN in the judicial branch is akin to the president in the executive branch. If the presidential system tolerates such a power, it is because it envisages a check from the legislature. fewer such checks exist for the CJN whose office is often the arbitrating arm of the three branches of government. In fact, the arbiter is potentially arbitrary.
Where we have a serving CJN we should have retired chief justice as the head, and all the other positions, including the president of the Federal Court of Appeal, should go to a retired person from that bench. Same should apply to all other positions of career judges.
The appointer should be a committee of retired judicial officers and lawyers.
This makes the dispensation of justice, while not infallible, as sacrosanct as we can make it. It is then that the NJC can pick an attorney general, while the president can pick his minister of justice to deal with routine matters of policy and administration.
The judiciary is long overdue for a fundamental overhaul and we have to think out of box to fix a system where, for instance, many think that money rather than law guarantees justice.
THE NATIONS NEWSPAPER
